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Policy windows, ambiguity and
Commission entrepreneurship:
explaining the relaunch of the
European Union’s economic reform
agenda
Paul Copeland and Scott James
ABSTRACT This article explains the relaunch of the European Union’s (EU)
economic reform agenda in 2010. After repeated delays during 2009, the European
Commission scaled back its initial plan for a revived social dimension and instead
proposed a strengthened governance architecture of economic surveillance. Using
the multiple streams framework we argue that the new Europe 2020 strategy
which emerged is a product of two overlapping policy windows which opened sud-
denly in the problem stream (the Greek sovereign debt crisis) and politics stream
(shifting institutional dynamics). This created a window of opportunity for skilful
policy entrepreneurs to ‘couple’ the three streams by reframing the existing Lisbon
Strategy as the EU’s exit strategy from the crisis. The article contributes to under-
standing policy change under conditions of ambiguity by demonstrating the
causal significance of key temporal and ideational dynamics: the timing of policy
windows; access to information signals; and the role of policy entrepreneurs.
KEY WORDS Europe 2020; European Commission; Lisbon Strategy; policy
entrepreneurship; windows of opportunity.
INTRODUCTION
Launched in March 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was intended to provide an over-
arching economic reform agenda for the next decade. Despite failing to achieve
many of its objectives (Tilford and Whyte 2010), the Commission began
drawing up proposals for a replacement during 2008 in which social and
environmental concerns would feature more prominently. By 2009 negotiations
had stalled and the consultation process on finding a successor to Lisbon was
repeatedly delayed. The Europe 2020 strategy which eventually emerged in
2010 diverged significantly from this: enshrining a new governance architecture
of strengthened economic surveillance centred around a new European Seme-
ster. The cumulative impact of these reforms was to subordinate the strategy’s
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longer-term social and economic objectives to progress in restoring fiscal sus-
tainability and macroeconomic stability.
Europe 2020 remains significant as the Commission’s initial strategic response
to the sovereign debt crisis. However, several important puzzles remain. Why
was the consultation process on replacing the Lisbon Strategy undertaken at
such a late stage? Why did the Commission change its strategy for relaunching
the economic reform agenda? How can we explain the unanticipated nature of
the governance reforms proposed in Europe 2020? The study responds to
recent calls for greater attention to be devoted to analysing the temporal and
ideational dimensions of policy change. It does so by utilizing one of the
more fruitful approaches to have been applied at the European Union (EU)
level in recent years: John Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework (MSF).
The article begins by outlining three testable propositions derived from the
multiple streams literature. These are used to explain the development of the
Europe 2020 strategy between 2008 and 2010 and to evaluate the Commis-
sion’s role as a policy entrepreneur in the relaunch of the EU’s economic
reform agenda. We conclude by reflecting on how the findings add value to
our understanding of the EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis.
MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK
Our motive for using the MSF stems from dissatisfaction with rational institu-
tionalist approaches to explaining policy change. First, rational approaches have
difficulty explaining policy-making that does not fit the linear problem–sol-
ution sequence. During economic crises policy is developed under heightened
conditions of ambiguity as policy-makers’ attention is scarce, information is
imperfect and policy preferences are fluid and opaque. Consequently, policy-
makers may act simply to be ‘seen to be doing something’ (Kingdon 1995).
Second, rational institutionalism downplays the role of agency and ideas in
shaping policy change. Ideas serve as a cognitive lens through which policy-
makers process information signals about the policy environment and develop
political strategies to mobilize action (Radaelli and Kraemer 2008). Over
time, new information causes reflexive agents to re-evaluate policy problems
and solutions. Finally, rational models ignore the temporal dimension by pre-
senting a static snapshot of the policy process. Policy-makers face severe time
constraints, so the timing of events can be crucial to catching policy-makers’
attention and creating a historically contingent window of opportunity for
reform.
The MSF by contrast sets out to demonstrate, rather than assume, rationality
(Zahariadis 2008: 525). The framework has become increasingly popular as a
means of analysing policy change in Brussels owing to the complexity of the
EU’s modes of governance in this ‘emergent garbage can’ (Richardson 2006:
24–5). Policy-makers face high levels of ambiguity, defined by the absence of
clear policy goals, time constraints, the fluidity of actor participation and the
opacity of jurisdictional boundaries. In this context the rational problem–solution
2 Journal of European Public Policy
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sequence breaks down as political power becomes a more important determinant
of policy outcomes (Zahariadis 2008). The MSF also facilitates analysis of the
ideational and temporal dynamics of policy change. It does so by proposing an
actor-centred analysis in which material pressures are transmitted to policy-
makers by information signals, interpreted through ideational frames, and acted
upon with political strategies. Furthermore, the causal significance of timing is
captured by the temporal conjunction of three independent streams – problems,
politics and policies – each of which operates according to a different timescale
(Borra´s and Radaelli 2011: 475).
A common criticism is that the three streams only provide a heuristic device.
Although the approach has generated a series of hypothetical propositions, these
have yet to be rigorously tested (Zahariadis 2008: 525). In response, we review
the three most important of these claims and formulate a series of theoretically
derived propositions to be tested in the study.
Information signals and coupling
Coupling is central to explaining how policy windows induce policy change.
Windows of opportunity constitute information signals from the broader
policy environment (such as socio-economic or political developments) to
which intentional agents respond (Ackrill and Kay 2011: 77). Policy-makers
are alerted to policy problems through feedback mechanisms, focusing events
and/or increased problem ‘load’. By contrast, developments in the politics
stream are dictated by electoral and legislative timetables which signal shifts
in inter- and intra-institutional dynamics. In the policy stream solutions
emerge from a primeval soup of ideas which are advocated by a range of
policy-making actors. For policy change to occur, policy entrepreneurs must
respond to these signals by ‘coupling’ the three streams together (Zahariadis
2008: 517). Coupling involves the strategic use of ideas through policy
framing devices: the strategic construction of narratives that mobilize political
action around a perceived policy problem in order to legitimize a particular sol-
ution. As a necessary condition for policy change, the absence of coupling pro-
vides a plausible explanation for the repeated delays to agreeing a successor to
the Lisbon Strategy during 2009, leading to our first proposition:
P1: The delay to agreeing a new economic reform agenda reflected the
inability of policy entrepreneurs to couple the three streams.
The timing of policy windows
The timing of policy windows is an important determinant of policy selection.
Zahariadis (2008: 519–20) informs us that when windows open in the problem
stream in response to focusing events, such as a health scare or natural disaster,
the process is consequential: policies are designed ‘rationally’ to address real
societal problems (‘problems require solutions’). By contrast, if windows open
P. Copeland & S. James: Explaining the relaunch of the EU’s economic reform agenda 3
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in the politics stream, policy-makers come under pressure to be ‘seen to be doing
something’. For example, a change of government may lead politicians to
implement manifesto commitments. In this instance the range of viable
policy solutions often dictates the problems to be addressed (i.e., ‘solutions
chase problems’). These hypotheses can be tested through the careful analysis
of the timing and sequencing of policy developments. This gives rise to the
second proposition:
P2: Europe 2020 is a product of a policy window in the:
a) problem stream in which ‘problems require solutions’; or
b) politics stream in which ‘solutions chase problems’.
Policy entrepreneurship and policy commissioning
We focus on the Commission’s role as a policy entrepreneur for two main
reasons. First, the article seeks to explain the formulation of the EU’s new econ-
omic reform strategy, rather than the negotiation or implementation of the
Europe 2020 agreement. Although we evaluate the influence of the Council,
the Commission is responsible for periodically reviewing the strategy’s overarch-
ing objectives and governance instruments, providing significant agenda-setting
opportunities (Borra´s 2009). Second, the Commission occupies a unique ‘hub’
role in the economic reform process, combining responsibility for both agenda-
setting and decision-making (Zahariadis 2008: 518). Thus, it not only advo-
cates policy ideas to decision-makers (in the Council), but is directly involved
in decision-making itself.
Ackrill and Kay (2011: 75) provide a useful distinction between policy entre-
preneurship (the act of selling policies to decision-makers) and policy commission-
ing (the act of selecting policies by decision-makers). They argue that the
capacity of Commission officials to engage in entrepreneurship is determined
by internal dynamics such as institutional ambiguity, defined as ‘a policy-
making environment of overlapping institutions lacking a clear hierarchy’
(Ackrill and Kay 2011: 73). In this situation, policies in one arena may increas-
ingly impact on connected policy arenas, forcing a decision where none would
have been taken. This policy ‘spillover’ can transform the balance of power
between policy-makers and represents a temporal reordering of priorities, sig-
nalling to skilful policy entrepreneurs that an opportunity exists to reframe
the nature of policy issues and reshape the agenda. This is particularly relevant
to agenda-setting within broad governance architectures, like Lisbon, which
span several Commission Directorates-General (DGs) and in which lines of
responsibility are unclear (Borra´s 2009). Heightened institutional ambiguity
and policy spillover should therefore provide greater scope for policy entrepre-
neurs within the Commission to couple the streams and reconfigure the reform
agenda.
4 Journal of European Public Policy
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Policy commissioning points to an alternative coupling mechanism: the
ability of entrepreneurs to respond to changes in information signals by design-
ing new policies or adapting existing ones to ‘fit’ particular policy windows. In
the search for legitimate solutions to new problems, policy-makers will tend to
choose from an existing menu of policies in order to maximize value acceptabil-
ity (the degree of support amongst participants) and technical feasibility (the
ease of implementation) (Zahariadis 2008: 518). We argue that this option is
potentially blocked if policies are characterized by negative feedback and evi-
dence of policy failure. However, policy commissioners may overcome this by
revising and reframing an existing solution around a new policy window,
thereby providing the policy with a renewed raison d’etre. Following this, we
test the following claims:
P3: Within the Commission:
a) policy entrepreneurs can (re)shape the policy agenda in response to heigh-
tened institutional ambiguity and policy spillover;
b) policy commissioners can exploit new policy windows to overcome percep-
tions of policy failure and renew existing policy solutions.
A further criticism of the MSF approach is its lack of specificity with respect to
the identification of causal variables (Bendor et al. 2001). Drawing on Natali’s
(2004) model of policy change, we identify two sets of independent variables –
socio-economic factors and political factors – which relate to the problem and
politics streams in the MSF and policy change as our dependent variable (in the
policy stream). The causal process is the opening of a policy window and the
coupling of the three streams. We argue that this is conditioned by three inter-
vening variables: timing (the point at which policy windows open); information
signals (about the nature of the window of opportunity); and policy entrepre-
neurs (who use this information to couple the streams). Through careful
process tracing of the sequence of events, we seek to illuminate the temporal
and ideational dimensions of policy change that explain the governance
reforms enshrined in the Europe 2020 strategy.1
EUROPE 2020
In 2000 the Lisbon Council set out a long-term holistic strategy designed to
facilitate co-ordination and reform across a broad range of macroeconomic,
employment and social policy. Following criticism of policy overload, poor
co-ordination and conflicting priorities in the mid-term review chaired by
Wim Kok, the Lisbon Strategy was relaunched in 2005 with a narrower focus
on growth and jobs, a new simplified set of integrated guidelines, and a stream-
lined multi-annual review process. Despite these modest reforms, the procedure
for ‘naming and shaming’ member states was never fully implemented (for an
overview, see Begg [2007]).
P. Copeland & S. James: Explaining the relaunch of the EU’s economic reform agenda 5
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Set against this backdrop, the Commission’s draft proposals for the Europe
2020 strategy, agreed by national leaders at European Council summits in
March and May 2010, constituted a significant revision of the economic
reform agenda. Like Lisbon, Europe 2020 is guided by a series of headline
targets and ‘thematic’ priorities related to employment policy, poverty
reduction, research and development and climate change aimed at raising
Europe’s competitiveness (European Commission 2010a, 2010b). But in
response to the crisis, the strategy proposed a step change in economic policy
co-ordination through reinforced mechanisms of budgetary discipline and
fiscal consolidation (see Armstrong 2012). To bring this about Europe 2020
enshrined a new preventive system of ex ante surveillance, the centrepiece of
which was a new annual ‘European Semester’. This necessitated three specific
governance innovations. First, on the basis of the economic priorities set out
in the Commission’s new annual growth survey, governments submit
medium-term budgetary and economic strategies for peer review prior to parlia-
mentary approval. This is achieved through the ‘simultaneous’ but ‘separate’
reporting and evaluation of Europe 2020 with the EU’s fiscal framework, the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Second, to strengthen the surveillance of
macroeconomic imbalances, the Commission proposed to develop new compe-
titiveness scoreboards to measure productivity, employment and public/private
debt. Finally, the ability of the EU to offer tailored policy advice through
country-specific recommendations was widened to include both macro- and
microeconomic issues. The Commission also gained the additional right to
apply political pressure on member states by issuing ‘policy warnings’ under
the new Lisbon Treaty.
The following sections explain how and why these important governance
reforms came about. We begin by detailing the slow pace of reform prior to
2010.
RETHINKING LISBON: FAILED COUPLING
In March 2008 the European Council endorsed the final three years of the
Lisbon Strategy and instructed the Commission to start reflecting on the
EU’s economic and social priorities beyond 2010 (European Council 2008).
Discussion within the Council focused on the need for Lisbon’s successor to
move away from the narrow growth and jobs agenda of Lisbon ‘II’ (from
2005–2010) by addressing rising public concern about energy, the environ-
ment and climate change. The Commission also began formulating plans for
a more prominent ‘social agenda’ as a way of addressing criticism from stake-
holders that the strategy had failed to connect sufficiently with society (EurActiv
2008). Despite this initial surge of activity, the momentum soon slowed and in
March 2009 national leaders decided to postpone further talks. Progress stalled
because of an absence of leadership from both main EU institutions. In the
European Council there was little enthusiasm to champion structural reform
in the midst of severe recession, the influence of traditional cheerleaders (such
6 Journal of European Public Policy
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as the United Kingdom [UK]) had waned, and other countries were distracted
by domestic economic challenges (Martens and Zuleeg 2009). Its ability to
provide leadership was also weakened at this time by the collapse of the
Czech government which held the rotating Presidency. Similarly, the Commis-
sion was hamstrung by uncertainty surrounding the composition of the new
college of commissioners, owing to be confirmed in the autumn. In the
second half of 2009 the Swedish Presidency made a concerted effort to recast
the Lisbon Strategy along Nordic lines, but their ambition of agreeing prelimi-
nary conclusions was abandoned owing to the worsening recession.2 This pol-
itical vacuum provided fertile ground for mounting criticism of Lisbon’s
failures and scepticism about the likelihood of the strategy ever being re-
launched.3
The evidence suggests that the lack of early progress can be attributed to a
failure of coupling, confirming proposition 1. In the problem stream a range
of new social and environmental problems had been identified, but there was
little agreement over how these should be prioritized. In the politics stream,
Europe 2020 had no national cheerleader in the Council to drive it along
(unlike Lisbon) and EU-level leadership was absent pending the appointment
of the new Commission. Policy entrepreneurs could therefore not couple the
three streams because although new problems existed, political action could
not be mobilized. More importantly, these early initiatives were largely isolated
from the EU’s broader response to the global financial crisis. As one official put
it, during the initial phase of brainstorming the effects of the crisis on the Lisbon
Strategy were not fully understood or even considered.4 The crisis could not
serve as a driver of reform at this stage because policy-makers did not make
the connection between the fiscal position of the member states and the EU’s
economic reform agenda.
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: THE PROBLEM STREAM
The nature and timing of different policy windows is central to our explanation
of policy change. With reference to proposition 2, we find that Europe 2020 is a
product of two overlapping policy windows. The first of these opened gradually
in the problem stream towards the end of 2009. The trigger was not the long-
running financial crisis or the worsening economic recession, but rather the
focusing event constituted by mounting speculation about sovereign default
in Greece. As one official explained, the wake-up call for policy-makers was
increasing speculation surrounding the potential for a sovereign debt crisis
spreading to several member states, calling into question the sustainability of
the eurozone for the first time.5 As attention increasingly focused on the
relationship between microeconomic reform (as part of the Lisbon Strategy)
and fiscal sustainability (under the framework of the Stability and Growth
Pact), so efforts at defining the aims and objectives of the new strategy were
thrown into flux. Using Kingdon’s (1995) terminology, the Greek crisis trig-
gered heightened levels of ambiguity as officials struggled to make sense of
P. Copeland & S. James: Explaining the relaunch of the EU’s economic reform agenda 7
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the proliferation of information signals emanating from the rapidly changing
external environment (problem ‘load’).
Policy windows do not by themselves induce policy change: rather, policy
entrepreneurs must exploit them by coupling the three streams together. This
is confirmed by the fact that the timing of this particular policy window had
the initial effect of derailing the Commission’s timetable for launching a
public consultation in September 2008. The source of the delay was doubts
about the Commission’s initial plan for a revived social agenda and continued
uncertainty surrounding the formation of the second Barroso Commission.6
The delay bought the Commission some valuable time, generating new mean-
ings and understandings about the causes and consequences of the crisis and
enabling policy-makers to begin redefining the nature of the problem.
However, the consultation process, which eventually ran from November
2009 to January 2010, provided only a fleeting window of opportunity for sta-
keholders to influence the drafting of the new economic reform agenda.
The prospect of substantive policy change remained bleak. With little over
three months before Lisbon expired, the consultation document was deliberately
vague, lacking any detailed proposals for governance reforms beyond increasing
the role of the European Parliament. This lack of ambition provoked a storm of
protest from some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Members of
the European Parliament (MEPs) who wanted the process delayed to the end
of 2010, and led national governments to call on the Commission to develop
an ambitious social plan to address rising unemployment (European Parliament
2009). Process tracing suggests that the Commission’s timidity can be explained
by its inability to couple the new policy window in the problem stream because
of continued obstacles in the politics stream.
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: THE POLITICS STREAM
Two inter-institutional developments in early 2010 signalled the sudden
opening of a new policy window in the politics stream. First, following the rati-
fication of the Lisbon Treaty, Herman van Rompuy was elected as the new Pre-
sident of the European Council and announced that addressing the economic
crisis was his first priority. Second, after a four-month delay the new Commis-
sion was finally confirmed on 9 February 2010. The President, Jose Manuel
Barroso, was determined to address criticism that he had been slow to
respond to the crisis by making Europe 2020 the centrepiece of his second
term (Dinan 2010). Recognizing that only the European Council could
provide the requisite political credibility to move the proposals forward, the
two Presidents agreed to establish a series of regular meetings and an informal
division of labour through which to kick start the economic reform process
(Dinan 2011; European Voice 2010). At a specially convened summit on 11 Feb-
ruary 2010, Barroso outlined plans for new policy initiatives and targets, while
van Rompuy focused on compliance and enforcement. In addition they agreed
that to secure greater buy-in from member states, the Commission would
8 Journal of European Public Policy
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extend the length of the policy window by presenting the broad contours of an
agreement in March but leave detailed discussion of governance reforms to the
June summit (Zuleeg 2010). The alliance of the EU’s two new Presidents was
therefore pivotal in unlocking the political process and creating the conditions
for effective policy entrepreneurship.
The role of national governments – acting either individually or collectively
– was limited for four reasons. First, the European Council was slow to react to
the warning signs from Greece and recognize that it even necessitated a Euro-
pean-level response (Zahariadis 2012: 106). German hesitation further pro-
longed the negotiations surrounding the first bailout and rapidly consumed
the scarce attention of national leaders. Second, although the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and the Eurogroup became more impor-
tant in managing the EU’s response to the sovereign debt crisis, this firefighting
role did not translate into effective strategic leadership on economic reform
(Puetter 2012). Third, the incoming Spanish Presidency was firmly in favour
of securing agreement on Europe 2020 but determined to play a backseat
role to permit the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms (Molina
2010). Finally, a continued lack of enthusiasm (notably from Germany) and
divisions about the desirability of governance reform hindered the capacity of
the Council to engage in effective policy entrepreneurship.
The national position papers submitted during consultation process reveal
support for the Commission’s ambition that the new strategy should address
the fiscal and macroeconomic challenges emerging from the eurozone crisis.
Beyond this, however, different coalitions formed around the need for
further governance reforms. A sizeable coalition of southern and eastern
states called for enhanced governance through binding economic convergence
criteria, greater use of legislative instruments and the integration of Europe
2020 with the Stability and Growth Pact.7 In the wake of the Lisbon
Treaty ratification process, however, the political climate was not conducive
to any further expansion of the EU’s legal competence.8 Opposition to sub-
stantive reforms came from the larger states, led by Germany and the Nether-
lands, both of whom rejected the Commission’s proposal to undertake
simultaneous reporting of the SGP and Europe 2020 as it could be counter-
productive to budgetary consolidation and would make surveillance ‘unnecess-
arily political’.9 The UK and France also opposed further supranationalization,
presenting alternative intergovernmental solutions to the search for better co-
ordination.
Although yielding few surprises, the consultation process acted as a powerful
feedback mechanism, signalling to policy-makers that a new policy window had
opened (as national governments welcomed the reframing of the strategy
around the eurozone crisis), but also indicating the limits of what was politically
feasible (as significant opposition to strengthened governance remained). In the
face of deep-rooted divisions within the Council, strategic policy entrepreneurs
in the Commission attempted to exploit this political vacuum by reshaping the
agenda.
P. Copeland & S. James: Explaining the relaunch of the EU’s economic reform agenda 9
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POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The opening of a policy window in the politics stream was also signalled by the
transformation of intra-institutional dynamics within the new Commission: in
particular, the replacement of Spanish socialist Joaquin Almunia as economic
and financial affairs commissioner by the Finnish liberal Olli Rehn. As well
as being a trusted lieutenant to the Commission President, Rehn heralded a
change of direction by declaring his priority for the new reform agenda to be
the restoration of healthy public finances through the enforcement of the Stab-
ility and Growth Pact (EU Observer 2010). These information signals were used
by policy entrepreneurs in DG Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) to
seize control of the drafting process within the Commission and recast the strat-
egy on its own terms.
The extent of these changes becomes clear when we compare the governance of
Europe 2020 with the Lisbon Strategy. After the relaunch of 2005, the strategy
was managed by a team of Commission desk officers drawn from the Secretariat-
General, DG ECFIN, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG
EMPL), and DG Enterprise and Industry (DG ENTR); with the other DGs pro-
viding an input as and when necessary.10 In the implementation of Lisbon, the
DGs had a roughly equal status: each being responsible for monitoring develop-
ments within their particular policy domain, while decisions on evaluation and
policy recommendations were reached through consensus.11 The governance of
the Lisbon Strategy was therefore characterized by a high level of institutional
ambiguity and policy spillover. Put simply, because policy decisions were
closely interconnected, different Commission DGs were forced to share owner-
ship and develop a consensual approach to decision-making. However the
absence of a clear hierarchy of authority also created a wider space for contesta-
tion, contributing to the conflicting aims and objectives that characterized the
early strategy. Contrary to proposition 3a, this situation undermined rather
than enhanced policy entrepreneurship within the Commission.
By contrast, the drafting of Europe 2020 was marked by clearer lines of
responsibility, stronger internal hierarchies and reduced contestation. Once
the new Commission had been confirmed, President Barroso and his colleagues
in the Secretariat General forged a strategic alliance with Commissioner Rehn
and DG ECFIN in order to ensure that the Commission would play a
leading role in reshaping the EU’s future economic governance.12 Not only
did the majority of ideas behind Europe 2020, the new annual growth survey
and the European Semester originate from within DG ECFIN, but the other
DGs were largely sidelined or ignored during the drafting process.13
Decision-making authority, which had hitherto spanned several different
DGs, was therefore gradually centralized around a single institutional location.
This evidence contradicts the claim in proposition 3a that heightened ambiguity
and policy spillover creates greater scope for policy entrepreneurship. Counter-
intuitively we find that skilful policy entrepreneurs within DG ECFIN were
empowered by the policy windows to claim ownership of the issue and seize
10 Journal of European Public Policy
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control of the agenda. This enabled them to reduce institutional ambiguity over
who would be responsible for drafting Europe 2020 and reverse policy spillover
between competing Commission departments – a process we refer to as policy
‘spillback’.
COUPLING THE THREE STREAMS
The final part of our explanation examines how the Commission successfully
coupled the three streams together to secure agreement on the Europe 2020
reforms. Using our framework, we consider the role of DG ECFIN in policy
commissioning: the selection of policies that fit particular policy windows. At
the start of 2010 policy-makers faced complex and at times contradictory infor-
mation signals arising from the policy windows that opened simultaneously in
the problem and politics streams. These generated autonomous pressures for
policy change: the Commission had to be seen to be responding effectively to
the sovereign debt crisis (the problem stream); and devise a replacement to
the Lisbon Strategy by a fixed deadline (the politics stream). Consequently
the option of no change (by simply renewing the existing Lisbon Strategy)
was unavailable, as it would not have been perceived as an effective response.
Yet, the Commission also lacked a mandate (from the Council) and sufficient
time (before the summit deadline) to secure agreement on radical change
through an expansion of the EU’s legal competence.
Nonetheless, these information signals proved decisive in enabling DG
ECFIN to couple the three streams together. This process took two forms.
First, officials redefined the nature of the problem that needed to be addressed
around the eurozone crisis, enabling Europe 2020 to be explicitly framed as the
EU’s ‘exit strategy’ from the crisis (policy framing). Second, policy solutions
were selected to fit the overlapping policy window: that is, reforms which
appeared to address the underlying causes of the sovereign debt crisis but
which could also be agreed by the political deadline of the European Council
summit (policy commissioning). We analyse each of these in turn.
The Commission consultation process yielded valuable information signals
which were exploited by policy entrepreneurs in DG ECFIN to reframe the
economic reform agenda. The submissions convinced officials that the crisis
could provide a powerful new narrative and the necessary political impetus to
re-launch the process. They were aided by several member states pushing for a
successor to the Lisbon Strategy which contained ‘something new’ in order to
‘prevent another Greece’.14 DG ECFIN therefore set about reframing the new
strategy, acknowledging Lisbon’s failings and recasting Europe 2020 as a ‘bold
policy response’ to the crisis.15 This required strengthened economic surveillance
to co-ordinate the withdrawal of national stimulus measures and to manage the
‘advanced interdependence’ that now existed within the eurozone. In the run up
to the March summit the growing sense of urgency enabled the Commission to
ratchet up the pressure even further, causing hitherto sceptical governments to
soften their opposition to stronger economic governance (EurActiv 2010).
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Having secured the European Council’s endorsement for the broad outline of
Europe 2020, the Commission immediately set about selecting a series of gov-
ernance reforms appropriate to the policy window that existed. The plan for a
new European Semester of ex ante economic surveillance ‘raised eyebrows’
when it was first presented in Brussels in May, as it unexpectedly proposed
that the EU should scrutinize member state budgets before national parliaments
(EurActiv 2010). It also confirmed and reinforced the reconfiguration of power
within the Commission by ensuring that DG ECFIN remained firmly in
control of the new surveillance process.16 In a notable concession to
Germany, the reporting and evaluation of Europe 2020 and the SGP would
remain ‘separate’ in order to ensure the integrity of the EU’s fiscal rules. This
compromise allowed DG ECFIN to propose ‘something new’ while stopping
short of the formal integration of Europe 2020 with the SGP.17 In doing so,
however, it rendered the achievement of the strategy’s longer-term economic
objectives dependent upon the more immediate priority of restoring budgetary
discipline. The cumulative effect was therefore to effectively subordinate the
Commission’s earlier plan for a revived social and environmental agenda to pro-
gress in restoring fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability. The degree
to which this diverged from the Commission’s initial strategy for relaunching
Lisbon provoked a backlash from social NGOs, many of whom accused the
Commission of reneging on earlier assurances to emphasize social protection
in favour of an agenda that reinforced austerity (Lu¨cking 2010).
We conclude by confirming proposition 3b: policy commissioners success-
fully coupled a revised policy solution (the Lisbon Strategy) around a new
policy problem (the sovereign debt crisis) by the political deadline (the Euro-
pean Council summit). In order to increase the likelihood of finding agreement
in the limited time available, DG ECFIN selected a solution from an existing
policy menu in order to maximize its value acceptability (as it complemented
rather than contradicted the Stability and Growth Pact) and technical feasibility
(because it built upon governance arrangements developed under the Lisbon
Strategy). More importantly, negative policy feedback and perceptions of
policy failure were overcome by substantively revising and relegitimating the
proposed solution around the emergence of a new policy window in
the problem stream (by framing Europe 2020 as the EU’s exit strategy from
the crisis). In doing so, the Commission was able to secure agreement on an
important series of reforms which established a new governance architecture
of economic surveillance.
CONCLUSION
At the start we posed three propositions as a means to assess the explanatory
value of the multiple streams framework, the results of which are summarized
in Table 1. Through careful process tracing, we demonstrate that the govern-
ance reforms enshrined in Europe 2020 are best explained through the temporal
conjunction of three independent streams. The framework confirms that there is
12 Journal of European Public Policy
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no simple linear relationship between socio-economic or political factors (the
independent variables) and policy outcomes (the dependent variable). By ana-
lysing critical temporal and ideational dynamics, the study reveals the causal
process to be highly contingent and mediated by the timing of policy
windows, access to information signals, and the role of policy entrepreneurs
(the intervening variables). We argue that the MSF constitutes more than a
heuristic device: through the formulation of theoretically derived propositions
it can provide a rigorous explanatory framework for analysing policy change
under conditions of heightened ambiguity.
The article concludes with three observations about how it contributes to our
understanding of the EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis.
Policy entrepreneurship/commissioning
The analysis of the coupling process provides new insights into sources of supra-
national autonomy within broad governance architectures like economic
Table 1 Summary of findings
Propositions Findings
1 The delay to agreeing a new economic
reform agenda reflected the inability
of policy entrepreneurs to couple the
three streams.
Yes. Progress in reviewing Lisbon
was hampered by confusion over
goals and institutional obstacles,
preventing the Commission from
coupling the streams.
2 Europe 2020 is a product of a policy
window in the:
a. Problem stream in which
‘problems require solutions’; or
b. Politics stream in which
‘solutions chase problems’.
Two windows opened
simultaneously: in the problem
stream signalled by a focusing
event (the Greek crisis); and in the
politics stream signalled by
shifting institutional dynamics (in
the Council and Commission).
3 Within the Commission:
a. Policy entrepreneurs can (re-)
shape the policy agenda in
response to heightened
institutional ambiguity and
policy spillover.
b. Policy commissioners can
exploit new policy windows to
overcome perceptions of policy
failure and renew existing policy
solutions.
No. DG ECFIN exploited the new
policy window to seize control of
the reform agenda, enabling them
to reduce institutional ambiguity
and reverse policy spillover (policy
spillback).
Yes. By re-framing its proposals as
the EU’s exit strategy from the
crisis, DG ECFIN was able to
couple an existing policy solution
around a new policy problem by
the political deadline.
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reform. In particular, the MSF serves to qualify zero-sum based accounts of
power which assume that the Commission has been irrevocably weakened by
the eurozone crisis (for example, Dinan 2011; Puetter 2012). In fact, we find
that the Commission served as the principal source of ideas behind Europe
2020 and the motor driving the agreement. It secured agreement on substantive
governance reforms in the face of significant odds: economic turmoil (in the
eurozone); institutional uncertainty (in the Commission and Council); negative
policy feedback (the Lisbon Strategy); and member state opposition (led by
Germany). The new agenda also served the wider political purpose of demon-
strating the Commission’s ability to remain relevant and act decisively in the
midst of the economic crisis (Armstrong 2012: 214).
We view our article as contributing to a growing body of strategic constructivist
literature which suggests that the Commission’s agenda-setting power is more sig-
nificant than rational models would predict (for example, Jabko 2006; Radaelli
and Kraemer 2008). Analysed through the lens of multiple streams, our article
supports the assertion that the Commission acts as a ‘purposeful opportunist’
in response to the opening of windows of opportunity (Cram 1994: 199). It
does so in three ways. First, by providing policy-makers with real and urgent
policy problems to address, focusing events like economic crises can increase
the scope for policy entrepreneurs to mobilize political action behind particular
solutions through the construction of new strategic narratives (policy framing).
Second, skilful policy entrepreneurs can exploit new sources of information to
reduce institutional ambiguity and reverse policy spillover by centralizing respon-
sibility and seizing control of the policy agenda (policy spillback). This contrib-
utes to Kingdon’s (1995) model by demonstrating that the opening of policy
windows can facilitate bureaucratic power ‘grabs’ by those best positioned to
interpret and respond to shifting signals about the wider policy environment.
Finally, policy-makers can increase the scope for reform by reconfiguring existing
policy solutions to fit new policy windows (policy commissioning). In the case of
Europe 2020, negative feedback and perceptions of policy failure ruled out the
option of policy renewal. Instead, the Lisbon Strategy had to be more substan-
tively revised and reframed as a legitimate solution to a new policy problem.
Crucially, however, we find that policy entrepreneurship is not a simple func-
tion of an agent’s structural position, but instead is fluid, dynamic and relational
in nature. In the case of Europe 2020, DG ECFIN was only able to capture the
drafting process through the formation of strategic alliances with two other
institutional actors: the Commission Secretariat General and the European
Council President. The first was cemented by the appointment of Rehn as
the new ECFIN commissioner, heralding a change of direction in the Commis-
sion’s strategy for relaunching Lisbon. The second led to the establishment of a
division of labour between the EU’s two Presidents which provided the necess-
ary political impetus to re-ignite the process. The findings suggest that where
national governments are agnostic and/or divided over reform, an ‘unholy alli-
ance’ of the Commission and European Council Presidents can exert significant
influence in reshaping the pace and content of the reform agenda.
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The timing of policy windows
The timing and sequencing of policy windows exerts a direct causal effect on the
likelihood and nature of policy change. By carefully tracing the process through
which independent policy windows open in different streams over time, the fra-
mework facilitates the identification of causal variables (socio-economic and
political factors) and allows us to map their differential impact on policy
change. This gives rise to two significant insights. First, the opening of simul-
taneous policy windows in different streams can alter the length and breadth
of the reform process. In the case of Europe 2020, this had the effect of widening
and shortening the window of opportunity for policy change because the Com-
mission had to devise a strategy for addressing the underlying causes of the
sovereign debt crisis (thus widening the scope for agreement) by a fixed political
deadline (owing to the expiry of the Lisbon Strategy).
Second, overlapping policy windows shape policy outcomes in unpredictable
ways. Zahariadis (2008) argues that when windows open in the problem stream,
policies are designed rationally to address real problems; by contrast windows in
the politics stream lead policy-makers to search for problems to address through
pre-existing solutions. Yet, neither of these outcomes accurately describes the
development of Europe 2020. On the one hand the analysis confirms that
policy-makers may not respond to urgent policy problems in the way that
rational models would predict (i.e., problems require solutions) because the
existence of a policy window in the politics stream can empower some policy
makers at the expense of others. On the other hand the opening of a window
in the problem stream impacts directly in the political arena by limiting the
extent to which viable solutions can simply dictate the range of problems to
be addressed (i.e., solutions chasing problems).
We propose a third outcome which occurs when policy windows overlap. In
this situation the need to address real policy problems by a clear political dead-
line privileges those actors capable of devising the most viable policy solution in
the limited time available. This is most likely to entail devising a ‘quick fix’ sol-
ution by reconfiguring an existing policy around a new problem. In early 2010
the opening of policy windows in both streams limited policy-makers’ room for
manoeuvre by ruling out the options of no change and radical reform. But in
this situation DG ECFIN was ideally placed to hastily craft a solution by coup-
ling a revised policy (the Lisbon Strategy) around a new problem (the sovereign
debt crisis) so as to secure agreement by the political deadline (the European
Council summit). The outcome (Europe 2020 and the European Semester)
we label solutions fit problems.
Information signals
Unlike rational institutionalism, the MSF facilitates analysis of the ideational
dynamics of policy change. The causal significance of policy windows derives,
in large part, from the critical role that information signals play in linking
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material pressures to intentional agents. These provide knowledge and aware-
ness about windows of opportunity for reform, but also constitute a valuable
source of meanings and understandings about the policy environment. At criti-
cal junctures new information can cause policy-makers to reinterpret their exist-
ing cognitive lenses, triggering sudden and unexpected shifts in political
strategy. Evidence for this comes from the failure of EU policy-makers to
adjust their strategy for relaunching Lisbon in response to the ongoing financial
crisis and deteriorating fiscal situation until a very late stage. Careful process
tracing confirms that this delay was not simply a consequence of political
obstacles but also cognitive ones. Policy-makers were simply slow to make the
connection between the crisis and the Lisbon Strategy as a consequence of
heightened ambiguity and a scarcity of attention.
Information signals also clarify the process by which ideas serve as a source of
power within the EU (Zaharaidis 2008: 527). The focusing event that caused
officials to re-evaluate their strategy was speculation surrounding Greece’s sover-
eign debt. The timing of these information signals, coinciding with the Com-
mission consultation process, was critical in providing certain policy-makers
with the necessary source of ideas to identify linkages with the economic
reform agenda. DG ECFIN exploited these signals to craft a more convincing
narrative about the need to prioritize fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic
stability at the expense of those calling for the prioritization of growth-friendly
investment and social cohesion (such as DG EMPL and social NGOs). Our
analysis confirms that this framing process was not simply strategic, but
instead rooted in the generation of new meanings and understandings about
the functioning of the Eurozone, which caused policy-makers to hastily re-
evaluate their policy preferences. Rather from conforming to the rational
problem–solution model, the picture we present of Europe 2020 is of a
process characterized by high levels of ambiguity and shaped by important tem-
poral and ideational dynamics which provided significant scope for skilful policy
entrepreneurs to manipulate the final outcome.
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NOTES
1 The article draws upon 12 anonymous interviews conducted in late 2010 in the
Commission and Council.
2 Sweden’s ambitions centred around prioritizing flexicurity, life long learning and
gender equality (Social Platform 2009).
3 Lisbon was criticized by several national leaders (for example, Deutsche Welle 2010),
while a senior French diplomat suggested it was ‘no longer a priority’ in the current
economic climate (EurActiv 2009).
4 Interview, DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010.
5 Interview, DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010.
6 Interview, Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010.
7 This group included Spain, Belgium, Italy, Denmark and Portugal, plus most east
European members (national position papers available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
secretariat_general/eu2020/contrib_member_states_en.htm).
8 Interview, Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010.
9 In the run-up to the March summit, Chancellor Merkel appeared to openly ques-
tion the need to reach a deal at the June summit (Financial Times Deutschland
2010).
10 Interview, DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010.
11 Interview, Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010.
12 Interviews, DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010; Commission Sec-
retariat General, 23 November 2010.
13 Interview, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 4 November 2010.
14 Interviews, Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010; DG Economic
and Financial Affairs, 8 December 2010.
15 Interviews, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 4 November 2010; DG
Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010.
16 Interviews, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 8 December 2010; Commission
Secretariat General, 23 November 2010.
17 Interview, Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010.
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